II. To the Question

191. [Solution of the question] - To the question [n.157] I reply that between the essential perfections there is only a difference of reason,Note by Scotus: “Every other opinion on this question, besides the one here, seems to evacuate as it were all the difficulties of the first book about the productions and the persons, as is touched on in distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un n.8].” ⁸⁸ that is, of diverse modes of conceiving the same formal object (for there is such a distinction between wise and wisdom, and a greater one at any rate between wisdom and truth), and there is not there only a distinction of formal objects in the intellect, because, as argued before, that distinction is nowhere in intuitive cognition unless it is in the object intuitively known [n.187]. These two members are also proved by the reasons made against the preceding opinion [sc. of Henry, nn.177-178, 182-183, 185-190].

192. So there is there a distinction preceding the intellect in every way, and it is this, that wisdom is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and goodness is in the thing from the nature of the thing - but wisdom in the thing is not formally goodness in the thing.

The proof of this is that, if infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, wisdom in general would be formally goodness in general. For infinity does not destroy the formal idea of that to which it is added, because in whatever grade some perfection is understood to be (which ‘grade’ however is a grade of that perfection), the formal idea of that perfection is not taken away because of that grade, and so if it as it is general does not include it formally as it is in general, neither does it as infinite include it formally as it is infinite.

193. I make this clear by the fact that ‘to include formally’ is to include something in its essential idea, such that, if a definition of the including thing be assigned, the included thing would be the definition or a part of the definition; but just as the definition of goodness in general does not include wisdom in itself, so neither does infinite goodness include infinite wisdom; there is then some formal non-identity between wisdom and goodness, insofar as there would be distinct definitions of them, if they were definable. But a definition does not indicate only the idea caused by the intellect, but also the quiddity of the thing; there is then a formal non-identity on the part of the thing, and I understand it thus, that the intellect, when combining this proposition ‘wisdom is not formally goodness’, does not, by its collative act, cause the truth of this proposition, but it finds the extremes in the object, from the combining of which the act is made true.

194. And this argument ‘about non formal identity’ the old doctors [e.g. Bonaventure] stated by positing in divine reality that there was some predication true by identity that yet was not formal; thus I concede that by identity goodness is truth in the thing, but truth is not formally goodness.

195. The rule of Anselm, Monologion ch.15: “It is necessary that it be whatever is altogether better it than not it;” no relation of reason is of this sort [sc. a perfection simply, n.185], and nothing is unless, when relations of reason have been removed, it is altogether the same in the thing and in reason; therefore Anselm’s rule is nothing other than ‘God is God’.

196. On the contrary. In [Monologion] ch.16: “If it be asked what that nature is, what better response than that it is justice?” Therefore anything at all is said of it in the ‘what’. The perfect quidditative concept is only one, or at any rate there is no formal distinction between ‘what’ and ‘what’. - Again, ch.17: “The nature itself in one way and in one consideration is whatever it is essentially.”

197. Response. ‘What’ by identity, not formally; proof of this gloss: ch.17 says: “justice signifies the same as the other things, whether all together or singly.” It is not understood here that they signify the same ‘formally and first’, because then they would be synonyms; therefore they connote the same, or signify the same really, not formally. Again, Damascene [n.198]. To the second [quote from Anselm, n.196]: he adds an example about man, who “is not in one way or in one consideration said to be these three: body, rational, man.” As to why, he posits two reasons: “in one respect man is body, in another rational;” second reason: “each of these is not the whole thing that is man.” It was in opposition to these two reasons that the remark ‘in one way and in one consideration’ was made.The Vatican editors note : “It was by opposition to ‘body’ and ‘rational’ (because they are not in man in one way or one consideration) that Anselm said on God’s behalf ‘in one way and one consideration’, and not that it really is so.” ⁸⁹

198. This opinion [of Scotus, nn.193-194] is confirmed by the authority of Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.4 cited previously [n.158], and ch.9, where he himself means that, among all the names said of God, the most proper is ‘Who is’, because he says God is ‘a certain sea of infinite substance’; but the other names - as he said in ch.4 - state things that ‘circumstance the nature’. This would not seem true unless there were some distinction on the part of the thing; for God is not ‘a sea of infinite substance’ because of the fact that many relations of reason can be caused in respect of him - for thus can they be caused by an act of intellect in respect of anything.

199. Note on behalf of the saying of Damascene, that ‘sea of perfections’ can be understood in one way for an act containing, both formally and in itself, all perfections under their proper formal reasons; thus nothing formally one is a ‘sea’, because it is a contradiction for one formal reason actually to contain so many reasons. In this way, then, nothing is a ‘sea’ unless it is identically one, that is: “God, wise, good, blessed’, and all the rest of this sort. Damascene is not taking ‘sea’ in this way.

200. In another can be understood [sc. by ‘sea of perfections’] something formally one, containing all perfections in the most eminent way in which it is possible for them all to be contained in one; but this way is that they are not only contained identically, because of the formal infinity of the container (for thus any [perfection] contains them all), but that further they are contained virtually, as in their cause, - and further still, in something as first cause containing them of itself, and as most universal cause, because containing them all. In this way ‘this’ essence is a ‘sea’, because in the case of any multitude one must come to a stand at something altogether first; in this [divine multitude] there is nothing altogether first save ‘this’ essence, therefore it is not only formally infinite, but it virtually contains the others; nor only some of them (as perhaps the intellect contains wisdom and understanding, and the will love and loving), but all of them, nor containing them by some other virtue of something else, but by itself. Therefore it has infinity formally and primarily, namely as well from itself as in respect of everything, an infinity universally causal and virtually containing, - and thus it is a ‘sea’, thus containing all of them as they can be contained eminently in some formally one thing. “All the rivers flow into the sea; whence they come thither do they return” (Ecclesiastes 1.7).

201. Therefore this proposition ‘God is wise’ is more per se than this other ‘the wise is good’. The other [sc. perfections other than the essence] have formal infinity, and if they have causal or virtual infinity (which needs to be preserved because of their nearer or remoter order to the essence), yet they do not have causal infinity with respect to all, nor do they have it with respect to any from themselves, but from the essence. - All these points [nn.199-201] are plain in the example of being and its properties (if they be posited to be the same, as is necessary [sc. for the purpose of the example]), if infinity is avoided.

202. On the contrary: the truest unity is to be posited in God; formal unity is truer than mere identical unity.

Response: formal unity is posited, but not of anything whatever in respect of anything whatever. If the major be taken in this way it is false of person and person, and the gloss would be: ‘[the unity] which is possible is true’; but, as it is, formal identity of anything whatever with anything whatever is not possible, but only real identity. From this middle the argument is made to the opposite, that every unity simply of perfection is to be posited there [sc. in God]; such unity there is identical unity, without formal unity, because it is simple and unlimited, but formal unity does not posit un-limitation.

203. The opinion [n.198] is confirmed by Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.1 n.2, where he proves that in divine reality ‘two persons are not something greater than one, because they are not something truer’. What consequence would that be? If it were only a distinction of reason between truth and wisdom and greatness, the argument would not seem to be different from an argument that proved ‘wisdom, therefore wise’, or conversely [n.191].

204. To what purpose, too, do the doctors who hold the opposite opinion [to that of Scotus] fill up so many pages demonstrating one attribute from another if there were between them only a difference of relations of reason? For God would seem thus to be perfectly known - as to every real concept - as he is known under one attribute just as if he were known under the idea of all the attributes, because the knowledge of several relations of reason does not make a more perfect knowledge, nor does it do anything for having a more perfect real knowledge of anything.

205. Likewise, third, in line with the aforesaid authority of Damascene [n.198], to what purpose do they [sc. those who hold the opposite opinion to Scotus] assign an order to the attributes, as if the essence were the foundation and certain attributes were closer to the essence and certain closer to the emanations? If they are only relations of reason, what is the order in comparison to the emanations?

206. Likewise, Augustine Against Maximinus II ch.10 n.3: “If you can concede God the Father to be simple and yet to be wise, good,     etc .” (and he enumerates there many perfections), “how much more can one God be simple and yet a Trinity, so that the three persons are not parts of one God.” - He argues there that if in the same thing without composition or division into parts there can be many perfections simply, therefore      much more can there be in the deity three persons without composition and division into parts. What argument would that be if the attributes only stated relations of reason and the persons were distinguished really? For this inference does not follow:

‘relations of reason do not cause composition in anything, therefore neither do real relations’.

207. Also the same Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.3 n.5 says that all those predicates [the ones listed in n.206] are equal. But nothing is equal to its own self. For what does it mean to say that something under one relation of reason is equal to itself under another relation of reason?

208. Hilary too in On the Trinity XII n.52, addressing God the Father, speaks thus: “Of Perfect God, who is both your Word and wisdom and truth, there is absolute generation, who in these names of eternal properties is born.” He says then that these properties are eternal, and that in this the Son is born of the Father, that is: the Father, possessing them first, communicates them to the Son. But if they were only distinct in reason, they would not seem be first in origin in the Father before the Son was produced. For whatever is produced there in being of reason by an act of intellect seems to be produced by the whole Trinity (and so is not in the Father as he precedes the Son in origin), as if necessarily preceding the origin.

209. But this formal non-identity stands along with the simplicity of God, because there must be this difference between the essence and the property, as was shown above in distinction 2, the last question [I d.2 nn.388-410] - and yet for this reason no composition is posited in the person. Likewise, this formal distinction is posited between two properties in the Father (as between not-being-born and father), which, according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7, are not the same property, because it is not the case that ‘he is Father by the fact he is ungenerated’. If then there can in one person be two properties without composition, much more, or at least equally, can there be several essential perfections in God ‘not formally the same’ without composition, because the properties in the Father are not formally infinite, but the essential perfections are formally infinite, - therefore any of them is the same as any of them.

210. [Doubts] - Against this solution [nn.191-209] there are three doubts.

For first it seems that the divine simplicity is not saved, because from the fact the essence is posited as the foundation and the attributes as circumstances of the essence [n.198] it seems that the attributes are disposed as acts and forms with respect to the divine essence.

211. The second doubt is that when Augustine (On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.9 ‘On Great Things’ and ch.2 n.3 ‘On Little Things’) denies the identity of paternity and deity -for he says he is ‘not Father by the fact he is ungenerated’ just as neither ‘is he the Word by the fact he is wisdom’ - he there concedes the identity of greatness and goodness, and of the essential perfections, because he says ‘he is great by the fact he is God’     etc . Therefore     , just as he there denies identity, so he concedes it here; but he only denies formal identity there, so he concedes it here.

212. The third doubt is that, just as goodness would not be really infinite unless it was really the same as wisdom, so it seems that the idea of goodness is not formally infinite unless it is formally the same as the idea of wisdom. Therefore, for the same reason as you posit true identity between the former, you should posit the formal identity of reason with reason.

213. To these doubts. - To the first [n.210] I reply that form in creatures has something of imperfection in a double way, namely because it is a form informing something and because it is part of a composite, - and it has something which is not of imperfection, but is consequent to it according to its own essential reason, namely that it is that by which something is the sort of thing it is. Example: wisdom in us is an accident, and this is a matter of imperfection - but that it is that by which something is wise, this is not a matter of imperfection but of the essential idea of wisdom. Now in divine reality nothing is a form according to that double idea of imperfection, because it neither informs nor is it a part; yet there is wisdom there insofar as it is that by which it - what wisdom is in - is wise, and this not by any composition of wisdom with anything as a subject, nor as the wisdom is a part of some composite, but by true identity, by which wisdom, because of its perfect infinity, is perfectly the same as anything with which it naturally exists.

But you will object: how is something formally wise by wisdom if wisdom is not the form of it?

214. I reply. The body is ensouled as it were denominatively, because the soul is the form of it - man is called ensouled not as it were denominatively but essentially, because the soul is something of it as a part; there is no requirement, then, that, for something to be the form informing something, it be itself of such a sort in itself, because the form is not a form informing the whole, although the whole is formally said to be such through it. If therefore some form were the same as something by a truer identity than is its identity with the thing informed, or with the whole of which it is a part, that true identity would be enough for the thing to be of such a sort by such a form; so it is in the intended proposition. - And then if you ask whether by first act there could be some abstraction of the form, - I say that there is not there abstraction of the form insofar as by it something is of such a sort taken precisely, without consideration of its identity with that which is of such a sort in itself.

215. To the second, which seems to possess difficulty from the words of Augustine [n.211], I say that in five ways is God wise and great by the same thing, and yet he is not God and Father by the same thing; in one way because wisdom and greatness are perfections of the same idea, that is, of quidditative idea, because whatever is perfected by those perfections is perfected not as by reasons of the supposit but as quidditative perfections, - but paternity and deity are not thus of the same idea; wisdom and goodness are also in another way of the same idea, because they are perfections simply, - not thus paternity and deity; in the third way, because greatness is the same as deity anywhere, - paternity is not but only in one supposit; in the fourth way, because goodness and wisdom and the rest of this sort are the same as it were by mutual identity, because each is formally infinite, because of which infinity each is the same as the other, - but paternity and deity are not thus mutually the same, because one of them is not formally infinite, but only deity is formally infinite, and because of this infinity paternity is the same as it; and, from this, fifth, he is good and wise by the same thing, ‘by the same thing’ - I say - by identity adequate in perfection, because each is infinite; paternity does not thus have adequate identity with deity, because it is not infinite.

216. To the form [of the argument, n.211] I concede that he is good and wise by the same thing in the way that he is not God and Father by the same thing, because by the same thing he is good and wise, namely by the same thing anywhere and by the same thing as by mutual identity; but paternity and deity are not the same anywhere. Likewise, by the same thing - that is by perfection of the same idea - he is good and wise, because he is quidditatively good and wise; he is not God and Father in this way by the same thing, because each ‘by which’, there, is not the essential perfection of that of which it is, because although the quiddity of paternity remains there, yet the quiddity is not the quidditative idea simply of any supposit, but the personal idea of the same is.

217. To the third [n.212] I concede that the idea of wisdom is infinite, and the idea of goodness similarly, and therefore this idea is that by identity, because an opposite does not stand with the infinity of the other extreme. Yet this idea is not formally that one; for this does not follow ‘it is truly the same as the other, therefore it is formally the same as the other’; for there is a true identity of a and b, without a formally including the idea of b.